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THE TAX BENEFIT RULE: A COMMON
LAW OF RECAPTURE
by
Win. D. Elliott *
ur federal income tax accounting system is based upon the tax year.
The tax effects of transactions, though, are frequently unconfined to
the artificial and rigid boundaries of that period. Events of earlier
years can affect the amount or character of both subsequent income and
deductions. The tax benefit rule is a term that loosely describes the judicial,
administrative, and legislative doctrine of accounting for events covering two
or more tax years.
A hallmark of modem tax reform is to achieve a rough, if not precise,
transactional parity. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 contained numerous pro-
visions designed to tax consistently different parts of the same transaction
occurring in different tax years.1 These provisions descend from the tax
benefit rule. Thus, what began as a minor tax accounting concept one-half
century ago has grown into a significant analytical tool for the Internal Rev-
enue Service. The tax benefit rule now provides the IRS with a major en-
forcement weapon in its unceasing efforts to achieve perfect transactional
parity. The potential of this old, but ever-expanding weapon appears
limitless.
The events that propelled the tax benefit rule into the IRS's heavy-duty
arsenal occurred in 1983 when the Supreme Court decided Hillsboro Na-
tional Bank v. Commissioner,2 which was a consolidation of the companion
cases of Hillsboro National Bank and United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc. 3 With
this decision the IRS departed from the old, rigid concepts that had marked
the tax benefit rule since the rule's inception. The Court paved the way for
this departure by providing the IRS with authority for a new approach, the
* B.S., Southeastern State College; J.D., Southern Methodist University; LL.M. (in
Taxation), New York University. Member, Moore & Peterson, P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, enacted or revised the
following: I.R.C. § 267(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985) (matching requirements on transactions be-
tween related parties); id. § 461(h) (all events accrual deduction delayed until economic per-
formance); id. § 467 (recapture of excluded rental income); id. §§ 1271-1275 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1985) (original issue discount rules expanded).
2. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
3. Id. In this Article the style Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner will be used
when referring to the general principles enunciated in that decision and the styles Hillsboro
National Bank or Bliss Dairy will be used when referring to particular facts or legal principles
pertaining to those specific cases.
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"fundamentally inconsistent" test.4 Failure to understand and appreciate
the significance of this new test could imperil the expected tax results of
carefully planned transactions. The burden on taxpayers, therefore, has be-
come even more unrelenting because of the new tax benefit rule, a common
law of recapture.
I. THE TAX BENEFIT RULE
A. Inclusion in Income
Originally, the tax benefit rule generally provided that if an amount de-
ducted in one year was recovered in a later year, the recovery constituted
income in the subsequent year.5 Congress modified the rule to provide that
if the earlier deduction did not reduce income tax liability, the taxpayer
could exclude the later recovery of the item from income.6 The general rule
is commonly called the rule of inclusion, and the statutory modification is
commonly called the rule of exclusion. Together, they constitute the tax
benefit rule. 7
The tax benefit rule applies not only to recoveries in a strict sense, but also
to situations involving increments to net worth.8 For example, the tax bene-
fit rule applied when a seller reimbursed a buyer for interest that the buyer
had prepaid and previously deducted.9 The rule also applied when a tax-
payer terminated a previously deducted accrued liability.10 Moreover, the
rule applied when a parent corporation that previously had deducted its
worthless investment in a subsidiary later used that subsidiary's net operat-
ing loses to shield the income of a profitable business that the parent had
4. Id. at 372, 383-84.
5. 1 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS 5.7 (1981).
At its inception the tax benefit rule concerned the recoveries of bad debts that taxpayers had
previously deducted. In 1922 the Treasury Department concluded that the recovery of a pre-
viously deducted debt constituted income. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 51, T.D. 3295, 24 Treas. Dec.
Int. Rev. 230-31 (1922). Later the Treasury Department applied the extreme rule that the
subsequent recovery of a bad debt was taxable whether or not the taxpayer actually took a
deduction, so long as that deduction was allowable. S.R. 2940, IV-1 C.B. 129 (1925). Gradu-
ally, the Treasury Department's stance shifted to the more moderate position that the later
recovery of a previously deducted bad debt was taxable only if the earlier deduction had
caused a reduction in taxable income. G.C.M. 20854, 1939-1 C.B. 76.
6. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 116, 56 Stat. 798, 812-13.
7. In discussing the widespread nature of the tax benefit rule, the Tax Court stated:
The tax benefit rule is both a rule of inclusion and exclusion: recovery of an
item previously deducted must be included in income; that portion of the recov-
ery not resulting in a prior tax benefit is excluded. The rule in both aspects
evolved judicially and administratively. The rule has been codified as to certain
items in sec. 111. While focusing on the second aspect (exclusion), sec. 111 is
predicated on the validity of the first aspect (inclusion). Although the rule has
been partly absorbed in the statute, it has been expressly stated that the unab-
sorbed portion of the rule continues to apply.
Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 652, 664 n. 10 (1976) (emphasis in original), afl'd, 601
F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979).
8. See Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. REV. 265, 272 n.23 (1978).
9. Weyher v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 825, 829 (1976).
10. Bear Mfg. Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1970); Mayfair Minerals,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, 88-94 (1971), af/'dper curiam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972).
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merged into the subsidiary."I Recovery of previously omitted income also
invokes the tax benefit rule. For example, when a taxpayer failed to include
funds embezzled from it in income, the court held that the taxpayer should
include in income the later recovery of those funds. 12
In some cases tax allowances or credits can trigger the tax benefit rule.
For example, a court held that receipts from sales of securities, following a
securities inventory write-down, were fully includable in income because of
the rule.13 Moreover, courts have been indifferent that, because of bracket
rate differentials, taxing a recovery of an earlier deduction in the current
year would not achieve a precise recapture of the earlier tax benefit. 14 The
foregoing examples demonstrate that the inclusionary component of the tax
benefit rule is an elastic concept that courts apply in a wide variety of
situations. 15
B. Exclusion from Income
The second part of the tax benefit rule is the exclusionary aspect, which is
codified in Internal Revenue Code section 111.16 The rule of exclusion gen-
erally provides that the later recovery of a deducted item is excluded from
income if the earlier deduction did not result in any tax benefit. Congress
first enacted section 111 in 194217 in an attempt to clarify confusion that
judicial decisions had created.' 8 In the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Congress
rewrote section 111 and substantially reduced that section's exclusionary
role. 19
The new section 111 provides an exclusion from gross income for recov-
eries "during the taxable year of any amount deducted in any prior taxable
11. Textron, Inc. v. United States, 561 F.2d 1023, 1027 (1st Cir. 1977).
12. Keystone Nat'l Bank v. United States, 57-2 U.S.T.C. 9773 (W.D. Pa. 1957). Simi-
larly, recovery of charitable contributions can invoke the tax benefit rule. In Rev. Rul. 76-150,
1976-1 C.B. 38, the IRS ruled that charitable contributions recovered by a taxpayer were in-
cludable in income in the year of recovery, although a subsequent contribution to another
charity qualified as a charitable contribution.
13. Union Trust Co. v. United States, 173 F.2d 54, 56 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
940 (1949).
14. 1 B. BITrKER, supra note 5, 5.7.1, at 5-48. The Court of Claims tried an exact
matching of tax brackets. Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270, 272 (Ct. Cl. 1958). The
Court of Claims, however, later abandoned that idea. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United
States, 381 F.2d 399, 402 (Ct. Cl. 1967); see Bittker & Kanner, supra note 8, at 270 n.17.
15. For other applications of the inclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule, see: Schultz v.
United States, 79-1 U.S.T. C. 9199 (E.D. Wis.) (state income tax refund), affid mem., 624
F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1979); Roxy Custom Clothes Corp. v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 851,
853-54 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (termination of previously accrued and deducted liability); Lime Cola
Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 593, 601-02 (1954) (termination of previously accrued and de-
ducted liability); Rev. Rul. 71-161, 1971-1 C.B. 76 (casualty loss); Rev. Rul. 71-160, 1971-1
C.B. 75 (casualty loss); I J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.35 (J.
Doheny ed., rev. ed. 1981) (prior deduction of bad debt).
16. I.R.C. § 111 (West Supp. 1985).
17. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 116, 56 Stat. 798, 812-13.
18. See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1942). The Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 enacted the prior provision without any substantive change. 1 J. MERTENS, supra note
15, § 7.34, at 117 n.1.
19. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1368, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 697, 1015.
1985]
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year to the extent such amount did not reduce income subject to tax."' 20 In
contrast, old section 111 excluded from income recoveries of bad debts, prior
taxes, or deliquency amounts to the extent that the earlier deduction was of
no tax benefit. 2 1 The regulations under old section 111 further extended that
section to "all other losses, expenditures, and accruals made the basis of
deductions," except for depreciation, depletion, or amortization. 22 Since the
new section 111 covers the recovery of any amount deducted, the new sec-
tion 111 appears to codify the all-inclusive coverage of the old section 111
and that section's regulations. 23
New section 111 provides that an exclusion from income for a later recov-
ery exists only to the extent that the prior item did not reduce income sub-
ject to tax.24 Under old section 111 the exclusion from income was limited
to the "amount ... which did not result in a reduction of the taxpayer's tax
... reduced by the amount excludable in previous taxable years with respect
to such [item]."' 25 New section 111 reverses the order of recovery of the
previously deducted item.26 Congress reported that a taxpayer should be
put in the same after-tax position as if he had deducted the proper amount.
27
Congress objected to old section 111 because the section assumed that a tax-
payer first recovered that part of the prior deduction that did not reduce
taxable income. 28 Congress believed that a taxpayer reaped a windfall if the
law assumed that the first dollars he recovered were not the dollars that
produced the tax benefit. 29
Example: Under old section 111 taxpayer had a $1,000 deduction at-
tributable to a section 111 item, but only $900 of excess itemized deduc-
tions, so $100 of the deduction for the section 111 item had no effect.
During the following year taxpayer recovered $150 of the section 111
item.30
The old section 111, as illustrated below, assumed that the part31 of the
section 111 item recovered first was the part that did not produce a tax bene-
fit. The new section 111 reverses this order of recovery. Under new section
111 the taxpayer first recovers the part of the section 111 item producing a
tax benefit and recognizes this part in income; the taxpayer then recovers the
part not producing a tax benefit and excludes this part from income. In the
above example, new section 111 requires that the taxpayer include in income
20. I.R.C. § 111(a) (West Supp. 1985).
21. Id. § Il1(a) (1982) (amended 1984).
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a) (1960).
23. Congress did not, when rewriting section I 11, intend to change or alter either the tax
benefit rule's scope or the meaning of a recovery. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT
OF 1984, at 522 (1984).
24. I.R.C. § 111(a) (West Supp. 1985).
25. Id. § I I I(b)(4) (1982) (amended 1984).
26. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1368-69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 697, 1015-17.
27. Id. at 1368, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1015-16.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1368-69, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1015-17.
30. See 1 B. BITTKER, supra note 5, 5.7.3.
31. The analysis is the same if the taxpayer has more than one § 111 item.
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Return as Recomputation
Filed (with of Return
deduction of (without
section 111 deduction of
item) section 111 item)
Gross Income $15,000 $15,000
Less:
Section 111 item 900
Zero bracket amount 2,300 2,300
Personal exception 1,000 1,000
Taxable Income $10,800 $11,700
Section 111 item $ 1,000
Increase in taxable
income due to excluding
section 111 item 900
Recovery Exclusion $ 100
Recovery Included in Income $ 50
the first $900 of the section 111 item recovered in the later year, and the
taxpayer may exclude only the last $100 recovered.
The tax benefit rule applies to credits as well as deductions. If the amount
recovered relates to a credit claim in a prior year, the tax is increased by the
amount of the recovered credit, but only to the extent that the prior credit
actually reduced the amount of the prior year's tax.
Example: Under new section 111 the taxpayer spent $2,000 on storm
windows and claimed a 15% energy conservation credit of $300. The
following year the manufacturer rebated $400. The taxpayer's tax in
the following year is therefore increased by $60 (15% x $400).32
The new section 111, however, does not apply to recoveries on which the
taxpayer previously recognized an investment tax credit or a foreign tax
credit because existing law already covers those recoveries. 33 Moreover, the
section provides that an increase in a carryover amount reduces the amount
of tax. 34 When computing accumulated earnings tax35 or personal holding
company tax,36 the new law allows any exclusion permitted under section
111, even if the prior deduction reduced the accumulated earnings tax or
personal holding company tax of the prior year. 37 If the prior deduction was
not deductible when computing the regular income tax, however, the section
111 exclusion from regular income is allowed only to the extent that the
32. When the deduction occurred under old § 111, but the recovery occurs under new
§ 11, the new rule should be applied. The rule is a rule of exclusion, hence the rule is applied
in the year when the taxpayer seeks the exclusion.
33. I.R.C. § Il(b)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
34. Id. § Ill(c).
35. Id. § 531 (1982).
36. Id. § 541.
37. Id. § 1 ll(d)(l) (West Supp. 1985).
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prior deduction did not reduce the prior year's accumulated earnings tax or
personal holding company tax. 38 A partial reduction of the accumulated
earnings tax or the personal holding company tax causes the later recovery
to be taxable to that extent since the recovered amount is presumed to have
been deducted first.
Example: Federal income tax is not deductible when computing regu-
lar income tax liability, but is deductible when computing accumulated
earnings tax and personal holding company tax. A refund of federal
income tax, therefore, is includible in income if the deduction of the
refunded amount had previously reduced the accumulated earings tax
or the personal holding company tax.
II. VARIATIONS OF THE TAX BENEFIT RULE
A. Reverse Tax Benefit 39
The tax benefit rule operates in reverse when the taxpayer refunds
amounts that he previously included in income. Section 134140 allows the
taxpayer to compute the tax effect of the repayment under a special method.
In the repayment year, the taxpayer pays the lesser of: (1) income tax com-
puted by deducting the repaid amount from taxable income; or (2) income
tax, computed without deducting the repaid amount from taxable income,
but reduced by the attributable tax detriment the taxpayer suffered in the
year he included the repaid item in taxable income.4 1 This methodology
ensures that the tax savings resulting from the later deduction is comparable
to the earlier tax paid.42
In United States v. Skelly Oil Co.4 3 the Supreme Court held that Skelly
Oil, which was required to return to customers money that it had previously
included in income, could deduct that repayment only if it applied percent-
age depletion to the repayment since it had applied percentage depletion to
the prior income." The favorable tax treatment given the earlier receipts
limited the deduction in the subsequent year. 45 Although courts have not
broadly applied the reverse tax benefit rule, the Supreme Court decision in
Skelly Oil suggests a significant application for the rule. Congress did not
intend to give taxpayers a deduction when they refunded money that they
had not included in income when received. 46
38. Id. § 11 (d)(2).
39. The phrase "reverse tax benefit" apparently originated in Bittker & Kanner, supra
note 8, at 281.
40. I.R.C. § 1341 (1982).
41. Id.
42. In O'Meara v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 622, 632-35 (1947), acq. 1947-2 C.B. 3, the IRS
argued that no deduction for refunds should exist when the inclusion of those items in the
previous year of receipt "brought the Government no tax benefit." 8 T.C. at 632.
43. 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
44. Id. at 683-86.
45. Rabinovitz, Effect of Prior Year's Transactions on Federal Income Tax Consequences
of Current Receipts or Payments, 28 TAX L. REV. 85, 86 (1972).
46. 1 B. BITrKER, supra note 5, 5.7.4; Bittker & Kanner, supra note 8, at 282.
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B. Quasi-Estoppel and the Unvert Doctrine
Rigid dedication to the annual accounting concept can lead to absurd re-
suits. For example, if the statute of limitations barred review of a year in
which the taxpayer had deducted an item that he subsequently recovered,
the taxpayer could argue that the later recovery should not be deemed to
have resulted in a tax benefit and should therefore not constitute income.47
In the tax benefit rule's early years the rule did not adequately deal with the
statute of limitations' closing of earlier deduction years. In Streckfus Steam-
ers, Inc. v. Commissioner"8 the Tax Court held that the tax benefit rule ap-
plied only when the deduction in the earlier year was properly taken. 49 In
that case the taxpayer erroneously deducted an Illinois sales tax in 1940. In
1943 an Illinois state court declared that the taxpayer was not liable for the
tax. The IRS argued that the taxpayer realized income in 1943 when it re-
covered the sales tax because the earlier deduction of the sales tax gave the
taxpayer a tax benefit. The Tax Court, however, held the tax benefit rule
inapplicable.50 A prior year's erroneous deduction could not be income in a
later year.51 Accordingly, the tax benefit rule did not apply even though the
statute of limitations barred correction of the erroneous deduction. The Tax
Court later softened the Streckfus Steamers rule in Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v.
Commissioner.52 In that case the court held that a taxpayer could not hide
behind the statute of limitations when it had misled the IRS and the IRS had
consequently allowed the statute of limitations to run.53
In Unvert v. Commissioner54 the Tax Court crystalized its position and
tolled the death knell of the Streckfus Steamers doctrine. In that case the
taxpayer prepaid interest on his future purchase of condominium units. The
taxpayer deducted the prepaid interest when he filed his return, believing
that the prepaid interest deduction was proper. Subsequently, the seller in-
formed the taxpayer that he would not complete the sale of the condomin-
ium units. The taxpayer then obtained a refund of his prepaid interest.
The IRS subsequently audited the taxpayer. The audit began when the
statute of limitations for the year of the aborted condominium purchase had
47. In Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931), the taxpayer experienced net
operating losses for three years, but in a later year recovered those losses in a lawsuit. The
Supreme Court denied the taxpayer the alternative of including the receipt in amended returns
for the loss years and held that the recovery of the previously deducted losses should be in-
come in the year of the recovery. Id. at 362-63; accord H.W. Nelson Co. v. United States, 308
F.2d 950, 955-56 (Ct. Cl. 1962). The harshness of the annual accounting concept led to the
wrong result and also led to the tax benefit rule.
48. 19 T.C. 1 (1952), nonacq. 1981-2 C.B. 3.
49. 19 T.C. at 8-9; see also Commissioner v. Schuyler, 196 F.2d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 1952)
(deduction erroneously taken in prior year not taxable in later year).
50. 19 T.C. at 8-9.
51. Id.
52. 56 T.C. 82 (1971), affd per curiam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Rev. Rul.
77-79, 1977-1 C.B. 34 (corporation recovering previously deducted state taxes paid under pro-
test was taxed on the recovery, at least to extent of the incremental percentage depletion of the
year of payment).
53. 56 T.C. at 91.




not yet run. During the audit the IRS requested certain information from
the taxpayer concerning the condominium, but the taxpayer did not re-
spond. After several unanswered subsequent requests, the statute of limita-
tions on the purchase year ran. The IRS, though, later obtained the
requested information through other channels.
The IRS argued that the recovery of the prepaid interest should be taxable
based on the tax benefit rule. The taxpayer, on the other hand, argued that
the tax benefit rule did not apply because of the erroneous deduction excep-
tion of Streckfus Steamers. Notwithstanding the fact that the taxpayer genu-
inely believed that he owned the condominium property when he filed his
return, the Tax Court held the taxpayer responsible for his misleading si-
lence during the audit.55 The court concluded that a duty of consistency
precludes a taxpayer who received a tax benefit in a prior year that is now
barred by the statute of limitations from claiming that the deduction was
improper. 56 Although the Tax Court did not expressly overrule Streckfus
Steamers, little doubt exists that the Unvert case represents the end of the
erroneous deduction exception to the tax benefit rule. A taxpayer who now
attempts to gain the tax benefit rule's protection by running the statute of
limitations will most likely fail.57
III. THE WATERSHED: HILLSBORO NATIONAL BANK AND BLISS DAIRY
Unquestionably, the single most important development in the tax benefit
rule since the 1942 enactment of section 111 is the 1983 Supreme Court
decision in Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner,58 which consists of the
companion cases of Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy. The Court's
reformulation of the tax benefit rule in that decision has ushered in a new era
for the rule. All future transactions must now be measured against the
Supreme Court's new test.
A. The Cases
In Hillsboro National Bank the Supreme Court applied the tax benefit rule
to a refund of property taxes paid to shareholders of an Illinois bank. In that
case Hillsboro National Bank paid and deducted Illinois property taxes im-
posed on the bank's shares. In 1970 Illinois amended its constitution to pro-
hibit such taxes. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, held the amendment
unconstitutional59 and the Illinois legislature passed a statute requiring the
collection and deposit into escrow of the disputed taxes. In 1973 the
Supreme Court upheld the state constitutional amendment, 6° which prohib-
55. 72 T.C. at 818.
56. Id. at 814-15.
57. For contemporary applications of Unvert, see: Rev. Rul. 81-207, 1981-2 C.B. 57 (em-
bezzled funds previously deducted as purchases); Ltr. Rul. 8344003 (July 14, 1983) (basis in
GNMA certificates).
58. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
59. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 I11. 2d 137, 273 N.E.2d 592, 599 (1971),
rev'd sub nom. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
60. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 365 (1973).
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ited the taxes, and Illinois refunded the taxes paid to the bank's sharehold-
ers. The bank had deducted its payment of the taxes in 1972 pursuant to
Code section 164(e). 61 The bank, however, did not report any income when
Illinois refunded the taxes to the shareholders in 1973. The IRS asserted a
deficiency against the bank based upon the bank's failure to include in in-
come the tax refunded to the shareholders. The bank argued that since the
shareholders, and not the bank, received the refund, the tax benefit rule did
not apply. The Tax Court held that the tax refund was income to Hillsboro
National Bank, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.62
In Bliss Dairy the taxpayer was in the dairy business. For the tax year
ending June 30, 1973, Bliss Dairy deducted approximately $150,000 for cat-
tle feed expenses. During the next tax year Bliss Dairy adopted a plan of
liquidation and distributed its assets to its shareholders. The distributed as-
sets included $56,000 worth of the cattle feed that Bliss Dairy had deducted
in the preceding tax year. Bliss Dairy, relying on section 336,63 reported no
income on the distribution of the previously deducted cattle feed. On the
other end of the distribution, Bliss Dairy's shareholders filed a section 33364
election and also did not recognize any income. The shareholders then con-
tinued to operate the dairy in a noncorporate form. Pursuant to section
334(c), 6 5 the shareholders presumably allocated part of their basis in the
redeemed stock to the cattle feed. Subsequently, the shareholders presuma-
bly deducted that basis as a business expense. The IRS claimed that the tax
benefit rule required Bliss Dairy to include in income the value of the unused
feed that it had distributed. Bliss Dairy paid the asserted deficiency and
brought a refund suit, asserting that the distribution was not a recovery
within the purview of the tax benefit rule. Bliss Dairy prevailed in the lower
court, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 66
The taxpayers argued in both cases that the tax benefit rule only required
taxpayers to report income in later years following a recovery of a previously
deducted item.67 In both cases the requisite recovery was missing. Neither
taxpayer corporation recovered anything. The IRS, therefore, pressed for
abandonment of the recovery requirement. The IRS asserted that the tax
benefit rule required a taxpayer to recognize as income amounts previously
deducted if later events were inconsistent with that earlier deduction.68 The
recovery of previously deducted taxes on bank shares and the distribution of
unused cattle feed to shareholders in liquidation were inconsistent with the
previous deductions. Accordingly, the IRS argued that both taxpayers
should recognize income.
The Court stated that the annual accounting system was a practical neces-
61. I.R.C. § 164(e) (1982).
62. 73 T.C. 61, 66-68 (1979), af'd, 641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981).
63. I.R.C. § 336 (1982).
64. Id. § 333.
65. Id. § 334(c).
66. 645 F.2d 19, 20 (9th Cir. 1981) (the district court decision was unreported).




sity to the income tax system, but the Court believed that strict adherence to
the annual accounting system produced transactional inequities.69 The
Court perceived the tax benefit rule's purpose as approximating the tax re-
sults that the taxpayer would achieve if it used a transactional rather than
annual accounting system.70 The tax benefit rule was designed to achieve
transactional parity while protecting both the IRS and the taxpayer from the
adverse effects of reporting a transaction based on what later prove to be
erroneous assumptions.7 1 The rule eliminated distortions that might other-
wise arise in an annual accounting system.
72
The Court did not agree completely with either the IRS's or the taxpayers'
arguments. The Court believed that the tax benefit rule was designed to tax
more than recoveries and that requiring a recovery would introduce an un-
desirable formalism into the rule's application. 73 The Court found that
lower courts had stretched the meaning of recovery to the point that the tax
benefit rule covered many situations that might not even be recoveries.
74
For example, the Court cited Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v.
Commissioner.7 5 In that case the taxpayer distributed previously expensed
assets in liquidation. The lower court applied the tax benefit rule and con-
cluded that a recovery existed in a practical, even though not in a technical,
sense.
76
The Court stated that not every unforeseen event will cancel an earlier
deduction.7 7 The Court concluded that the tax benefit rule cancelled an ear-
lier deduction only when the later event was fundamentally inconsistent with
that deduction. 78 Consequently, a court should invoke the tax benefit rule
whenever the subsequent event would have foreclosed the deduction if that
event and the deduction had occurred in the same tax year. 79 The Court no
longer required a recovery.80 The tax benefit rule now consisted of the fun-
damentally inconsistent test.8
1
Although an inconsistent event invokes the tax benefit rule, an unexpected
event does not.8 2 The Court illustrated the distinction between inconsistent
and unexpected events with the following example. If a taxpayer properly
expensed rent attributable to year two in year one, and a fire then destroyed
69. Id. at 377.
70. Id. at 381.
71. Id. at 383.
72. Id. at 389.
73. Id. at 381-82.
74. Id. at 382.
75. 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
76. 582 F.2d at 382.
77. 460 U.S. at 383.
78. Id. The first apparent use of the inconsistency test was in Estate of Block v. Commis-
sioner, 39 B.T.A. 338, 340-41 (1939), aff'd sub nor. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 11
F.2d 60 (7th Cir. 1940).
79. 460 U.S. at 383-84.
80. Id. at 381.
81. Id. at 383-84. A later event that is fundamentally inconsistent with the earlier deduc-
tion might also be an actual recovery of the type traditionally encountered in the tax benefit
rule.
82. Id. at 383 n.15.
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the building in year two, the tax benefit rule would not apply because fire is a
normal business risk.8 3 Conversion of the leased premises to personal use,
on the other hand, would have been fundamentally inconsistent with the
taxpayer's business, and would have invoked the tax benefit rule.8 4 To deter-
mine whether a fundamentally inconsistent event occurred a court must ana-
lyze the purpose of the deduction in the light of the later event.8 5 If the
deduction occurred in the context of a nonrecognition provision, the Court
observed that tension existed between nonrecognition and the tax benefit
rule.8 6 The Court could not articulate any general rule concerning whether
the tax benefit rule would override a nonrecognition provision.8 7 Rather,
whether the nonrecognition provision prevails will depend upon the facts of
the particular case.88
In Hillsboro National Bank the Court reviewed the hazy legislative history
of section 164(e),8 9 which granted the bank authority to deduct the tax on
the bank's stock. The Court believed that Congress enacted that section to
ease the burden on banks, which historically paid those taxes. 90 Nothing in
the legislative history indicated that Congress intended a later refund of the
taxes to the bank's shareholders to affect the validity of the deduction.9 1 The
Court therefore concluded that the act of payment was the significant event
and that the later refund to the shareholders was not fundamentally incon-
sistent with the earlier deduction.9 2
The Court analyzed the tax consequences to the bank assuming that Con-
gress had never enacted section 164(e). 93 Absent that section, the bank
could not have deducted the payment of the taxes because the taxes were not
imposed on the bank, but on the shareholders. Moreover, the shareholders
would have received a constructive distribution when the bank paid their tax
obligation. If the bank had earnings and profits, the constructive distribu-
tion would have constituted a taxable dividend. The shareholders, however,
would have been allowed an offsetting deduction for the tax payment. With-
out section 164(e), therefore, no tax consequences existed to either the bank
or the shareholders. The bank did not receive a deduction; the shareholders
received an income and deduction wash. 94 In contrast, under section 164(e)
the transaction still constitutes a wash to the shareholders because they do
not recognize income and they are not allowed a deduction.95 With section
164(e), though, the bank may take a deduction.96
83. Id. at 384-85.
84. Id. at 385.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 386.
88. Id.
89. I.R.C. § 164(e) (1982).
90. 460 U.S. at 393-95.
91. Id. at 394.
92. Id. at 394-95.
93. Id. at 392.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 392-93.
96. Id. at 393.
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In Bliss Dairy the IRS argued that the dairy received a tax benefit when it
expensed the cattle feed and during the next year distributed that same feed
to the dairy's shareholders. The taxpayers, on the other hand, argued that
the general nonrecognition rule of section 336,97 rather than the tax benefit
rule, controlled the tax effect. Lower courts divided on the need for an actual
recovery to invoke the tax benefit rule in section 336 cases. The Ninth Cir-
cuit required a recovery. 98 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit theorized that since
the tax benefit rule applied to section 33799 transactions, then not to impose
the rule in section 336 transactions would be inequitable. 1°°
In Bliss Dairy the Supreme Court examined section 162(a), 10 1 which per-
mits deduction of the ordinary and necessary business expenses of carrying
on a trade or business. The Court believed that Congress granted the ordi-
nary and necessary business expense deduction because the taxpayer's busi-
ness would consume the item within the tax year. 10 2 The conversion of that
item to personal use, therefore, was inconsistent with the earlier business
deduction. 10 3 The Court concluded that the tax benefit rule mandated that a
taxpayer include a converted expense item in income because the conversion
was fundamentally inconsistent with the purpose of the prior deduction. 1°4
Thus, Bliss Dairy's distribution of the previously deducted cattle feed was
inconsistent with the prior deduction of that feed.
The Court next inquired whether the section 336 nonrecognition rule pro-
tected Bliss Dairy from the tax benefit rule.'0 5 Section 336 provides that a
corporation will not recognize income because of distributions of appreci-
ated property in liquidation. The Court concluded that Congress's purpose
in enacting section 336 was to prevent recognition of unrealized appreciation
in an arm's-length transfer to an unrelated party.106 The Court also noted
that exceptions existed to section 336's nonrecognition treatment for depre-
ciation recapture and assignment of income. 10 7 Moreover, the Court ob-
served that an exception from analogous section 337 existed in favor of the
tax benefit rule. 10 8 The Court reasoned that a similar exception from section
336 should exist as well. 109 Accordingly, a corporation should recognize
income upon distribution of previously expensed items. Bliss Dairy there-
fore was taxed on the feed on hand at the moment of liquidation.110
97. I.R.C. § 336 (1982).
98. Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837, 839-40 (9th Cir. 1963).
99. I.R.C. § 337 (1982). Section 337 provides that a corporation in the process of liqui-
dating will not recognize income when selling the corporation's business assets. Id.
100. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378, 381-82 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
101. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982).
102. 460 U.S. at 395.
103. Id. at 396.
104. Id. at 395.
105. Id. at 397.
106. Id. at 398.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 401.




The Court did not believe that addressing the proper amount of income to
Bliss Dairy was necessary.' The Court ruled that the income to Bliss
Dairy was the cattle feed on hand at liquidation. 1 2 The Court did not an-
swer the question of whether the income to Bliss Dairy should have been the
lesser of the amount Bliss Dairy previously deducted or the cattle feed's ba-
sis to the shareholders.
Justice Stevens dissented in Bliss Dairy because Bliss Dairy had not re-
ceived a recovery." 3 Justice Stevens read prior cases to require a recovery
and stated that inconsistency, without more, was an insufficient basis for
future taxation. 1 4 He believed that a court should examine subsequent
events only to determine whether a recovery had occurred and not to review
the premises for the prior deduction." 5 Justice Stevens also expressed con-
cern over the Court's broadening of the tax benefit rule and consequent en-
largement of the IRS's powers.11 6 He believed this expansion would
produce controversy and litigation." 7
B. The Meaning of Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy
The central issue in Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner was the defi-
nition of the tax benefit rule's scope." 8 The fundamentally inconsistent test
gives the IRS greater power than the old tax benefit rule. The search for the
premise of the prior deduction required by the new test virtually guarantees
that the IRS can apply its own form of subjectivity to the transaction. Tax
advisors will have to make difficult decisions on tax reporting because of the
almost impossible task of distinguishing mere inconsistencies from funda-
mental inconsistencies." 9 This interpretative difficulty can only enhance the
111. Id. at 403.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 421 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Also dissenting were Justices Blackmun, Bren-
nan, and Marshall.
114. Id. at 405-12.
115. See id. at 418.
116. Id. at 404.
117. Id. at 416; see also Yin, Supreme Court's Tax Benefit Rule Decision: Unanswered
Questions Invite Future Litigation, 59 J. TAX'N 130, 131 (1983):
[T]he various broadbrush tests articulated by the Court have potentially far-
reaching consequences that will provide vexing problems for both tax practition-
ers and the IRS and will likely spawn additional litigation in the area. Rather
than providing a blissful end to the tax benefit rule controversy in these corpo-
rate contexts, the Court may have reopened a number of issues that were hereto-
fore thought settled.
118. Blum, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Income Tax Controversies-Hills-
boro National Bank and Bliss Dairy, Inc., 61 TAXES 363, 365 (1983).
119. Professor Blum focuses on the key test created by the Court and concludes: "[T]he
language about fundamental and lesser inconsistencies [is] bound to cause puzzlement among
tax advisors." Blum, supra note 118, at 366. Professor Martin Ginsburg, in his unique way,
describes the Court's "newly crafted analytic tool" as "an invitation to unending litigation and
the virtual assurance that we will not develop a coherent body of case law interpreting the tax
benefit rule." Address by Professor Martin D. Ginsburg, Decisions on Appeal: The Developing
Role of the CAFC, The First Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Courts of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit (May 20, 1983), reprinted in 100 F.R.D. 499, 564, 570 (1984).
Professor Ginsburg also experiences particular difficulty with the fundamentally inconsistent




The distinction between mere inconsistencies and fundamental inconsis-
tencies literally requires an examination of whether, if the later event had
occurred in the tax year of the original deduction, the deduction would have
been disallowed. If so, upon the happening of the later event, the taxpayer
should recognize income. Under the facts of Bliss Dairy, distribution of the
cattle feed in liquidation, if it had occurred in the year of payment, would
have prevented the deduction for the feed. An important distinguishing fac-
tor between Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy is the degree of control
and participation over the subsequent inconsistent event. In Hillsboro Na-
tional Bank the bank could not control the subsequent property tax refund,
although in Bliss Dairy the dairy planned the liquidation. The Court's single
example of the new tax benefit rule's application draws the same distinction.
The fire in the subsequent year was outside the taxpayer's control and there-
fore not inconsistent with the preceding year's rent deduction. Personal use
of the leased premises, however, would trigger tax benefit recapture since the
determining factor was the taxpayer's decision to convert the property to
personal use.
Another uncertainty following from Bliss Dairy involves the relationship
of the tax benefit rule to the Code's nonrecognition provisions. The Court
declined to resolve the tension between the tax benefit rule and the nonrecog-
nition provisions with a blanket rule. 120 Instead, the Court determined that
a court must focus on the particular Code provisions at issue in the case. 121
This refusal to adopt a general rule is a further invitation to uncertainty. 122
When a nonrecognition transaction provides for total nonrecognition of
gain and either carryover or substituted basis, then the reasons for applying
the tax benefit rule are unclear. The inherent gain in the transferred prop-
erty is preserved, and the tax on that gain is deferred, not avoided. In Bliss
Dairy the Court did not seem concerned with the tax treatment of the assets
distributed to the shareholders. The Court believed that distribution in liq-
uidation was inconsistent with the feed deduction, which was allowed on the
premise that the dairy would consume the feed. The Court did not consider
the shareholder basis in the distributed feed. If applying the tax benefit rule
forecloses a double deduction, then applying the rule is perhaps justified. If
no double deduction is possible, however, no reason exists why the tax bene-
fit rule should be applied. The Court's analysis does not distinguish the situ-
ation in which a double deduction is likely from the situation in which such
a possibility does not exist.
Another difficulty with Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner relates
to footnote 20 of the majority opinion. 123 Footnote 20 hypothesizes on the
application of the tax benefit rule to gifts and legacies of previously expensed
tragically unable to identify a fundamental inconsistency even though it bites me on the ankle.
I strongly suspect I am not alone in this . Id.
120. 460 U.S. at 386.
121. Id.
122. Blum, supra note 118, at 367.
123. 360 U.S. at 386 n.20.
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assets.124 The problem with this footnote is that the footnote specifies gifts
and legacies as future targets for the tax benefit rule, 125 but no one had previ-
ously considered that the tax benefit rule might apply in these settings. For
the Court to raise the specter of gifts or death triggering the tax benefit rule
is, at the least, adventuresome judicial decision-making.
IV. TRANSACTIONAL APPLICATIONS
A. Relationship to Earlier Events
The tax benefit rule will not always apply merely because some later event
is fundamentally inconsistent with the earlier deduction. Rather, a nexus
must exist between the later and earlier events. The IRS has indicated that a
direct relationship must exist between the event that constitutes the loss and
the event that constitutes the recovery. 126 For example, receiving money
from a debtor on a second debt, after the taxpayer had previously written off
the first debt as worthless, would not invoke the tax benefit rule if the money
recovered were not part of the first debt. 1 27
B. Nonrecognition Transactions and Carryover Basis
A central issue in Bliss Dairy was whether the judicial tax benefit rule
would override the statutory nonrecognition rule of section 336. The
Supreme Court decided that section 336 was subordinate to the tax benefit
rule. 128 A liquidating corporation, therefore, recognizes income upon liqui-
dation and distribution of an expensed asset. Despite this ruling, the Court
was unwilling to issue a universal rule to deal with all Code nonrecognition
provisions. 1 2 9
124. The footnote states:(T]he Government's position implies that an individual proprietor who makes a
gift of an expensed asset must recognize the amount of the expense as income
.... Similarly, the Government's view suggests the conclusion that one who
dies and leaves an expensed asset to his heirs would, in his last return, recognize
income in the amount of the earlier deduction. Our decision in the cases before
us now, however, will not determine the outcome in these other situations; it
will only demonstrate the proper analysis. Those cases will require considera-
tion of the treatment of gifts and legacies as well as [depreciation recapture pro-
visions], which are a partial codification of the tax benefit rule ... and which
exempt dispositions by gift and transfers at death from the operation of the gen-
eral depreciation recapture rules.
Id.
125. Blum, supra note 118, at 369.
126. See Ltr. Rul. 8312057 (Dec. 20, 1982); see also Allen v. Trust Co., 180 F.2d 527, 528
(5th Cir. 1950) (taxpayer not entitled to use tax benefit rule to exclude gain on sale of stock
that he had previously accepted in part satisfaction of a bad debt, while writing off the remain-
ing part as worthless, because stock sale was a separate transaction from the earlier
acceptance).
127. Sloan v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 254, 263 (6th Cir. 1951).
128. 460 U.S. at 402.
129. Id. at 386; see Ballou Constr. Co. v. United States, 85-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9418 (D.
Kan. 1985) (restoration of sand deposit into income by liquidating subsidiary; tax benefit rule




The Code contains many tax benefit rules in the form of statutory recap-
ture. Sections 1245130 and 1250131 are obvious examples of codified tax ben-
efit rules. Those sections require that a taxpayer recognize as ordinary
income excess depreciation taken in prior years. The depreciation recapture
sections indicate the extent to which those sections override the statutory
nonrecognition rule. Those sections exclude the following from depreciation
recapture: (1) transfers that are gifts; 13 2 (2) transfers at death; 133 (3) trans-
fers that are tax-free exchanges, except to the extent that the exchange in-
volves boot;134 and (4) transfers within certain Code sections that involve
carryover basis, except to the extent that the taxpayer recognizes gain.
135
Similar rules cover investment tax credit recapture. Excluded from invest-
ment tax credit recapture are: (1) transfers at death; (2) transfers during
most reorganizations; and (3) transfers during mere changes in the form of
operating the business, so long as the property is retained in the business and
the taxpayer retains a substantial interest in the business.
136
Other recapture rules that exempt gifts, transfers at death, and carryover
basis transactions concern: (1) expensed intangible drilling costs;13 7 (2) ex-
pensed mine exploration expenditures; 138 and (3) expensed soil and water
conservation and land clearing expenditures preceding dispositions of farm-
land. 139 When the Revenue Act of 1962 added section 1245,14° legislative
motivation for excepting nonrecognition/carryover basis transactions from
recapture was the belief that a tax-free transaction that involved carryover
basis was not a transaction on which recapture should occur.141 Likewise,
nonrecognition/carryover basis transactions, as well as gifts and transfers at
death, are not the type of transactions on which the tax benefit rule should
apply because these transactions are not fundamentally inconsistent with
corresponding earlier deductions.
130. I.R.C. § 1245 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985).
131. Id. § 1250.
132. Id. §§ 1245(b)(1), 1250(d)(1) (1982).
133. Id. § 1245(b)(2), 1250(d)(2).
134. Id. §§ 1245(b)(4), 1250(d)(4). The exchange must be tax-free under either § 1031 (ex-
change of property held for productive use or investment) or § 1033 (involuntary conversion).
135. Id. §§ 1245(b)(3), 1250(d)(3). The transfer must be within either § 332, § 351, § 361,
§ 371(a), § 374(a), § 721, or § 731 to qualify for the exception.
136. Id. § 47(b).
137. Treas. Reg. § 1.1254-2 (1980).
138. I.R.C. § 617(d)(3) (1982).
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.1252-2 (1976); see also Treas. Reg. § 16A.1255-2 (1981) (temporary
regulation) (exceptions from recapture of excluded cost-sharing payments received); H. CONF.
REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 895, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1445, 1583 (Treasury Department to provide exceptions from recapture of certain excluded
rental income similar to exceptions in §§ 1245 & 1250).
140. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960, 1032-36.
141. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. A109-12 (1962); S. REP. No. 1881, 87th





In a partnership context, the application of the tax benefit rule could oc-
cur at either the partnership or individual partner level. The regulations
apply the rule to the partners, not to the partnership. 42 Accordingly, if a
partnership deducts an item when the partnership has income, but when
none of the partners has sufficient income to allow the deduction to have a
tax effect, then the partnership's later recovery of that item should not be
taxed, despite the reduction of partnership level income. A contrary result
was reached, however, under an ancient case. 143 Logic and at least one lead-
ing source, though, favor the regulation's approach.144
B. Multiple Taxpayers
When more than one taxpayer deducts or recovers an item, application of
the tax benefit rule becomes difficult. Courts established early that a tax-
payer claiming that no tax benefit resulted from an earlier deduction must be
the taxpayer that took the deduction. 145 A husband and wife who file a joint
return in the year of the deduction are treated as a single taxpayer in the
year of the recovery if they also file a joint return in that year. 146 If they file
separate returns in the recovery year, however, the section 111 exclusion, if
any, is divided between them on the basis of their contributions to the earlier
tax benefit.' 47 If the recovery year is a joint return year, but the deduction
year was a year of separate returns, then the section 111 exclusion is based
on the income of the spouse who deducted the recovered item in the earlier
separate year.'
4 8
C. Successors-in-Interest to the Taxpayer
Both the inclusionary and exclusionary parts of the tax benefit rule pre-
suppose that the taxpayer taking the earlier deduction and recovering it later
are one and the same. When the deduction and recovery occur to different
taxpayers, application of the tax benefit rule is problematic. Section
381(c)(12) allows a taxpayer's successor-in-interest, in a transaction that sec-
tion 381 governs, to succeed to the transferor corporation's right to recover
"bad debts, prior taxes, or deliquency amounts previously deducted or
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8)(i) (1960).
143. Haughey v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 1, 3-5 (1942).
144. 1 W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITEMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNER-
SHIPS AND PARTNERS 9.05[3][i] (1977).
145. Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. REV. 129, 171 (1943) (citing
Michael Carpenter Co. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 626 (1942), affid on other grounds, 136
F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1943)).
146. This result follows because when a husband and wife file a joint return, each can take
advantage of the losses of the other. Plumb, supra note 145, at 174 (citing Taft v. Helvering,
311 U.S. 195 (1940); Helvering v. Janney, 311 U.S. 189 (1940)).




credited."' 149 The regulations extend the reach of this statute to "all other
losses, expenditures and accruals" of the transferor. 150 The section 111 ex-
clusion, therefore, extends to the successor-in-interest in transactions gov-
erned by section 381.
In a bankruptcy setting the trustee of the bankrupt estate is a successor-in-
interest of sorts to the debtor. If the trustee experiences an event fundamen-
tally inconsistent with an earlier deduction of the debtor, application of the
tax benefit rule is not analytically tidy. When the bankruptcy estate is a
separate taxpayer and legal entity, the tax benefit rule perhaps should not
apply. When the bankruptcy estate and debtor are not separate entities,
however, a court could logically apply the rule.
D. Incorporation
A section 351i1" transfer of assets is generally a nontaxable transaction to
the transferor. The shareholder has merely transferred property to a con-
trolled corporation and has not changed the form of the investment. Incor-
poration is not the moment for taxing the inherent gain in the assets
transferred to the corporation, especially since the corporation's basis in the
transferred assets is the same as the transferor's. When the taxpayer incor-
porates a going business the transferred assets are usually ordinary income
items, such as inventory, accounts receivable, previously deducted materials
and supplies, and contract rights. A court in this situation may subordinate
section 351 to certain judicial doctrines, such as the assignment of income
doctrine. 15 2 One of these judicial doctrines is the tax benefit rule.
The Supreme Court confronted application of the tax benefit rule in the
context of an incorporation in Nash v. United States.153 The case involved
incorporation of a partnership that previously had deducted bad debt reserve
additions. Applying the tax benefit rule, the IRS restored into the partner-
ship's income the prior bad debt reserve deduction. The IRS conceded that
no recovery existed since the transfer of property was to the corporation and
not the partnership. The IRS nevertheless urged the Court to adopt the
"end of need" theory when applying the tax benefit rule. According to this
theory, a court should not permit a taxpayer to retain the tax benefit of a
deduction if later events demonstrated that the taxpayer was no longer enti-
149. I.R.C. § 381(c)(12) (1982). Section 381 governs § 332 liquidations and certain trans-
fers in connection with § 368(a)(1) type A, C, D, F, or G reorganizations. Id. § 381(a).
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c)(12)-1(a)(2) (1961). On two occasions the Tax Court has ad-
dressed a successor-in-interest's use of the tax benefit rule. In Erie County United Bank v.
Commissioner, 21 T.C. 636, 641-43 (1954), a predecessor corporation did not deduct bad
debts, and the predecessor's basis for those bad debts was carried over to the successor. When
the successor's subsequent recovery did not exceed that basis the recovery was not taxable
income to the successor. Id. at 646. In Ridge Realization Corp. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.
508, 523-26 (1966), the court permitted the successor to utilize § 111 when the predecessor had
deducted losses, but had not received any tax benefit from them.
151. I.R.C. § 351 (1982).
152. B. BiTTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 3.17, at 3-67 (4th ed. 1979).
153. 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
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tied to that tax benefit. 154 A court should not, therefore, limit application of
the tax benefit rule to cases in which there has been a recovery. 15 5 The
Court did not apply the tax benefit rule, however, because no event justified
the rule's application. 156 The incorporation and attendant transfer of the
bad debt reserve to the corporation did not enrich the taxpayer. The value
of the stock that the taxpayer received was based upon the value of the re-
ceivables less the bad debt reserve. The taxpayer, therefore, realized no eco-
nomic gain.
The Court, however, did not foreclose application of the tax benefit rule to
section 351 transactions. The Court indicated that the tax benefit rule would
apply to section 351 transfers to the extent that an economic recapture of the
prior deductions existed.1 57 Section 351 transactions are, therefore, poten-
tially subject to the tax benefit rule if the stock received is exchanged for
assets having a short life.15 8
Following Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, one can argue that
the policy implicit in statutory depreciation recapture of not imposing a tax
in carryover basis situations should preclude application of the tax benefit
rules to incorporations. 5 9 The continuation of the inherent gain to the
transferee corporation should prevent application of the tax benefit rule until
the corporation's disposition of the property. The tax benefit rule may have
some vitality, though, if the taxpayer contributes previously expensed assets
154. Brief for the United States at 7-14, Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970). The
"end of need" analysis derives from a series of Tax Court cases that provided that a taxpayer
must restore into income any balance in the bad debt reserve in the year when the need for the
reserve ceased. Arcadia Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 679, 681-82 (1960),
affld, 300 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1962); West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 341, 343
(1959), affid, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961); Geyer, Cornell & Newell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 6
T.C. 96, 100 (1946). The "end of need" argument was also part of the IRS's aggressive use of
the tax benefit rule in the early 1960s. Rev. Rul. 62-128, 1962-2 C.B. 139 (upon incorporation
of a sole proprietorship involving transfer of a bad debt reserve, the amount of the reserve is
ordinary income to the transferor because the transferor no longer needed the reserve), re-
voked, Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. 139.
Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the IRS argument raised
in that revenue ruling. In Estate of Schmidt v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 111, 113 & n.7 (9th
Cir. 1966), the Ninth Circuit concluded that the cases cited in Rev. Rul. 62-128, 1962-2 C.B.
139, revoked, Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. 139, did not support the "end of need" argument
because the taxpayers in those cases actually collected the amounts previously reserved. In
Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970), the Supreme Court decided that incorporation of a
partnership with attendant transfer of a bad debt reserve to the corporation did not enrich the
taxpayer because the corporation issued the stock based upon the value of the receivables less
the bad debt reserve. Id. at 4-5. No event, therefore, justified applying the tax benefit rule. Id.
Although the Court agreed that incorporation ended the need for the bad debt reserve, the
Court refused to equate the end of that need with a recovery for purposes of the tax benefit
rule. Id. at 3-4. Moreover, Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy demonstrate that the
"end of need" analysis is inadequate for determining application of the tax benefit rule. At the
very least, the "fundamentally inconsistent" test has supplanted the "end of need" analysis.
155. Id.
156. 398 U.S. at 4-5.
157. See id.; see also O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Princi-
ple of the Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 27 TAx L. REV.
215, 245 (1972) (discussing application of tax benefit rule to corporate liquidations).
158. B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 152, T 3.17, at 3-68 to -69.
159. See Rev. Rul. 71-569, 1971-2 C.B. 314.
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to the newly formed corporation. For example, if the taxpayer contributes
assets on which he previously took deductions, the transfer may be funda-
mentally inconsistent with the earlier deduction, much like the distribution
of cattle feed in Bliss Dairy.
E. Change of Tax Status
Some taxpayers receive a tax allowance merely because they qualify for a
certain tax status. The new tax benefit rule has potential application if they
lose this preferred tax status. 160 These tax allowances can take the form of
enhanced deductions or exemptions. For example, section 593161 permits
savings and loan associations to take a greater bad debt reserve deduction
than most ordinary businesses. Most businesses are allowed to add to their
bad debt reserve only if justified by their actual loss experience. 162 Certain
savings and loan associations, on the other hand, may qualify for special bad
debt reserve deductions equal to forty percent of taxable income. 163 A
novel, if not explosive, application of the tax benefit rule to a change of spe-
cial tax status might occur when a previously qualified savings and loan as-
sociation fails to qualify. If a court applied the tax benefit rule, the savings
and loan association would have to take back into income the excess bad
debt reserve deduction previously allowed.
For the tax benefit rule to cause recapture of a disqualified savings and
loan association's enlarged bad debt reserve deduction, a twofold analysis
must be considered. First, one might ask whether a court would allow a
deduction for the special addition to the bad debt reserve in the same year
that loss of the qualified status occurred. The answer is clearly no. Second,
one must determine whether the enhanced bad debt deduction is premised
upon the special tax status of being a savings and loan association, so that
loss of that tax-favored position would be fundamentally inconsistent with
the enhanced deduction. On this second point, a court must closely examine
the legislative history of section 593 to discern whether the premise for al-
lowing the deduction is the tax status of the savings and loan association or
merely the act of making real estate home loans.
Since 1952, thrift institutions have been subject to the regular corporate
tax.164 The enlarged deduction for additions to bad debt reserves, however,
160. For example, a grandparent may claim a dependency exemption by paying college
tuition for a grandchild. If the college later refunds some of the tuition, the grandparent would
not qualify for the dependency exemption based upon the net amount paid. Questions can also
arise concerning taxpayers filing as a surviving spouse or head of household when they later
discover that they did not qualify for that status. See 1 B. BITrKER, supra note 5, 5.7.2, at 5-
53 n.35. Moreover, a trust's gain or loss of grantor trust status might trigger recapture.
161. I.R.C. § 593 (1982).
162. Although I.R.C. § 166(c) (1982) allows most businesses to use the reserve method of
accounting for bad debts, ordinarily these businesses are only allowed a deduction to the extent
justified by their actual loss experience. See Treas. Reg. § 1.166-4(b) (1960).
163. I.R.C. § 593(b)(2)(A) (1982).
164. Until 1951, savings and loan associations were exempt from federal income tax. In
1951, Congress imposed a tax on savings and loan associations for the first time because in-
come is added to their reserves and undivided profits. "The fact that it is retained for the
benefit of the members makes it analogous to the income retained by an ordinary taxable
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has allowed thrift institutions to pay a lower rate of tax than most ordinary
businesses.' 65 Administrative commentary concerning section 593 suggests
that the enhanced bad debt reserve deduction afforded savings and loan asso-
ciation is because of their special status as savings and loan associations, not
because these organizations make home mortgage loans.166 The loss of the
qualified savings and loan association status, therefore, would be fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the earlier enhanced bad debt reserve deduction. Ac-
cordingly, a court should require a disqualified savings and loan to recapture
the enhanced part of the previous bad debt deductions.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATIONS
A. Ordinary Expenses
The IRS has indicated that the tax benefit rule does not apply to ordinary
business expenses previously deducted, even if the deduction resulted in a
tax. benefit. 16 7 Excluded from this rule, however, are prepayments and ordi-
nary expenses that create transferable assets.1 68 The pertinent rulings in-
volved liquidations of insurance companies. The expenses in question
include brokers' commissions, salaries, directors' fees, printing and station-
ery, sales commissions, telephone costs, and legal and accounting fees. The
IRS concluded that these expenses did not represent unconsumed assets or
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders." S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 26-29,
reprinted in 1951 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1969, 1994-97.
165. During the consideration of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the Treasury Department
candidly admitted that to call the special tax treatment afforded to savings and loan associa-
tions and other financial institutions "bad debt reserve provisions" was misleading:
In substance, the present bad debt reserve provisions for commercial banks,
mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations are misnomers, and to a
large degree are merely techniques for lowering the tax burdens of these institu-
tions. This tax reduction intent is quite obvious in the case of the two latter
types of institutions where the lower effective tax rate is the result of the law
itself.... Congress desired to continue to provide some preferential tax treat-
ment to these institutions ... through the bad debt reserve deduction. The
Congress presumably was influenced by ... (1) the use of the ... institutions by
small savers, and (2) the emphasis on home mortgage loans in the institutions'
lending policies. Also ... a factor was the ... view ... that a catastrophe type
reserve was needed because of widespread mortgage defaults in the 1930's.
Treasury Department Studies and Proposals 466-67, reprinted in TAX MGMT. (BNA)-PRI-
MARY SOURCES I, 593(b).13 (1971).
166. When Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1969 the Treasury Department ex-
pressed its preference that the taxation policy of savings and loans not be institutionally based.
The Treasury Department thought that the tax law could promote mortgage lending and resi-
dential construction by tying tax subsidies to the loan itself and not to the institution. Accord-
ing to the Treasury Department's analysis, "[t]his would encourage commercial banks, which
do not now get the subsidy, to make a lot more mortgage loans than they have been making in
the past." Statement of The Honorable Charls E. Walker, Undersecretary of the Treasury,
before the Senate Finance Committee 755-56, reprinted in TAX MGMT. (BNA)-PRIMARY
SOURCES I, 593(b).32-.33 (1971). The Treasury had presented an alternate proposal that
would have said to savings and loans, mutual savings banks, or commercial banks that to "the
extent it holds socially preferred type assets such as residential mortgage loans" than they
would incur a reduced tax obligation. Id.
167. See Ltr. Rul. 8312057 (Dec. 20, 1982); Ltr. Rul. 8207068 (Nov. 20, 1981).
168. See Ltr. Rul. 8312057 (Dec. 20, 1982); Ltr. Rul. 8207068 (Nov. 20, 1981).
1985]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
short-lived property on hand at the time of liquidation. 169 Accordingly, the
tax benefit rule did not apply.
B. Research and Development Expenses
In a National Office Technical Advice Memorandum, the IRS applied the
fundamentally inconsistent test of Hillsboro National Bank v. Commis-
sioner.170 The taxpayer was engaged in the manufacture and sale of chemi-
cals and related products and incurred substantial expenditures for research
and development. Generally, the taxpayer used the generated patents and
confidential information in the business, but occasionally disposed of them.
The taxpayer reported these sales as capital gains. The IRS characterized
the proceeds from these sales as ordinary income to the extent that the tax-
payer had previously deducted the research and development expenses at-
tributable to them under section 174(a)(1). 17 1
The IRS analogized the research and development expenses to section 162
expenses.172 The IRS concluded that if the taxpayer deducted the expendi-
tures under section 162 in one year, the sale of the project in that year would
have caused that deduction to be denied. Since sections 174(a)(1) and 162
are comparable, the later sales of patents and confidential information were
fundamentally inconsistent with the earlier deductions under section
174(a)(1). The IRS cited Revenue Ruling 72-258173 as authority. 174 That
revenue ruling applied the tax benefit rule to the receipt of insurance pro-
ceeds following destruction of a development model. The taxpayer had de-
veloped a pilot model and deducted the cost of that model under section
174(a)(1). In the following year the model was destroyed. The IRS taxed
the insurance proceeds as ordinary income to the extent of the previous de-
duction, 17 5 even though the IRS would normally have taxed the insurance
proceeds as capital gains under section 1231.176
C. Accrued Interest in Foreclosure
In a National Office Technical Advice Memorandum 177 the IRS held that
on foreclosure of real property, the owner should recognize as ordinary in-
come accrued and previously deducted, but unpaid, interest to the extent
that such interest exceeds the fair market value of the property, less the out-
standing mortgage. The IRS concluded that the taxpayer had not paid the
169. See Ltr. Rul. 8312057 (Dec. 20, 1982); Ltr. Rul. 8207068 (Nov. 20, 1981).
170. Ltr. Rul. 8409009 (Nov. 23, 1983).
171. Id.; see I.R.C. § 174(a) (1982).
172. I.R.C. § 162 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985).
173. 1972-2 C.B. 481. The IRS did not reach the question of whether the Corn Products
doctrine applied. See Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 51-53 (1955) (gain
from the sale of property integral to a business is taxed as ordinary gain). In G.C.M. 39162
(Mar. 2, 1984) the IRS applied the tax benefit rule rather than the Corn Products doctrine.
174. Ltr. Rul. 8409009 (Nov. 23, 1983).
175. Rev. Rul. 72-258, 1972-2 C.B. 481.
176. I.R.C. § 1231 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985).
177. Ltr. Rul. 8041017 (June 30, 1980).
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previously deducted interest to that extent.1 78 Under the Hillsboro National
Bank v. Commissioner formulation of the tax benefit rule, no doubt should
exist concerning the outcome. The original deduction was granted on the
premise that the taxpayer would pay the interest. Subsequent foreclosure
and failure to pay the interest is fundamentally inconsistent with that
deduction.
D. Pension Contributions
The tax benefit rule does not apply when a corporation merges an
overfunded and an underfunded employee benefit plan if the corporation
funded the plans under the same insurance contract and the plans were part
of the same plan document. 179 If the corporation funded the plans through a
separate trust, however, the tax benefit rule requires recapture of the deduc-
tion pertaining to the overfunded plan. 180 In contrast, Revenue Ruling 73-
528181 held that a transfer of funds from an overfunded plan to an un-
derfunded plan triggered the tax benefit rule. The contributions to the
overfunded plan were intended for the exclusive benefit of participants and
beneficiaries of that plan and not for the purpose of funding another separate
plan.
The IRS might also use the tax benefit rule to cause a corporation to re-
capture prior pension contribution deductions if the plan is terminated pre-
maturely. The premise of the plan contributions is that they are for the
benefit of employees in an ongoing plan. Upon plan termination, the IRS
could argue that the plan was not permanent and the prior deductions
should, therefore, be retroactively disallowed. 182 The IRS's failure to win on
the permanence argument, however, should still not prevent the IRS from
attacking the plan termination as a fundamentally inconsistent event.
E. The Tax Benefit Rule and the Cancellation of Indebtedness Doctrine
Application of the tax benefit rule to the cancellation of indebtedness doc-
trine produces interesting, but questionable, results.'8 3 The cancellation of
indebtedness doctrine appears to be the superior theory. Thus, as a general
proposition, forgiveness of liability will constitute income whether or not the
liability produced a tax benefit in an earlier year.' 8 4 When debt forgiveness
occurs in a contribution to capital context, such as when a shareholder for-
gives a debt the corporation owes him, the IRS has attempted with little
success to use the tax benefit rule to tax the shareholder to the extent of the
178. Id.
179. Ltr. Rul. 8221087 (Feb. 25, 1982).
180. Id.
181. 1973-2 C.B. 13.
182. Rev. Rul. 69-25, 1969-1 C.B. 113. But see Lincoln Elec. Co. Employees' Profit Shar-
ing Trust v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1951).
183. 1 B. BiTrKER, supra note 5, 6.4.5.




previously deducted interest on the debt.18 5
VII. MEASURING THE TAX BENEFIT
A substantial uncertainty in the application of the tax benefit rule is the
amount of income to be recognized upon the later recapture of an earlier
deduction, allowance, or credit. Justice Stevens dissented sharply in Bliss
Dairy, partly because the majority failed to answer this question.186 Justice
Stevens perceived that the majority made the following inconsistent state-
ments on the proper amount of recaptured income: (1) recaptured income
should equal the amount of the earlier deduction; 187 (2) recaptured income
should equal the amount of the sale proceeds when a later sale is the incon-
sistent subsequent event;188 and (3) recaptured income should be less than
the earlier deduction if the item's fair market value at the time of the later
event has decreased.' 89 The majority's reply to Justice Stevens's criticism
was simply that they did not attempt to resolve the question of the appropri-
ate amount of recapture.1 90 The answer to this important question, there-
fore, must be left to future litigation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner has taken
the tax benefit rule significantly farther along the path of resolving transac-
tional inequities arising out of the annual accounting concept. The tax bene-
fit rule has now moved away from the position of a minor policing role and
towards the position of a major IRS enforcement tool, away from mere inci-
dental occurrence in the lives of taxpayers and towards an omnipresence in
most tax sensitive transactions, away from relative certainty and towards
greater ambiguity. The tax benefit rule has broken from the past, so much so
as to be almost unrecognizable from its early beginnings. The tax benefit
rule is now a judicial rule; its future can only be tested and defined through
future litigation. So grows the common law.191
185. 66 T.C. at 665-68.
186. 460 U.S. at 419-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's opinion also leaves unclear
the amount of income that is realized in the year in which the fundamentally inconsistent event
occurs.").
187. Id. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 383. The majority stated that "[lthe
proper increase in taxable income [to Bliss Dairy] is the portion of the cost of the grain attribu-
table to the amount on hand at the time of liquidation." Id. at 403.
188. Id. at 419-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 395; see also Rosen v. Commissioner,
611 F.2d 942, 943-44 (1st Cir. 1980) (taxpayer realizes value of recovered asset determined at
time of recovery).
189. 460 U.S. at 419 n.29 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 402 n.37; see also Feld, The
Tax Benefit of Bliss, 62 B.U.L. REV. 443, 463-64 (1982) (discussing proper amount of recap-
ture in Bliss Dairy).
190. 460 U.S. at 402 n.37.
191. I have borrowed this language from the concluding sentence of Bromberg, Corporate
Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731, 754 (1968) (describing
implications of another Supreme Court decision on common law).
[Vol. 39
